We describe a model of a network of N sub-networks (or routers) where M network users making concurrent point-to-point connections by selling and buying router capacity to and from each other. The resources need to be acquired in complete bundles, but there is only one spot market for each router, i.e. no way to place bids on complete bundles. In order to describe the internal dynamics of the market, we model the observed prices by N -dimensional Itô-processes. Modeling using stochastic processes is novel in this context of describing interactions between end-users in a system with shared resources, and allows a standard set of mathematical tools to be applied. The derived models is intended to price contingent claims on network capacity and thus to price complex network services such as, trading resource bundles, pricing quality of service levels, multicast service, etc.
Introduction
This paper presents a model of the state of a communication network. The network is modelled as a graph where a node represents a cluster of routers, such as a proprietary network, or even an individual router, and the network state is modelled as a correllated stochastic process. As we have shown [Rasmusson01] , the resulting model can be used to calculate an objective price of complex network services with quaranteed quality of service level, QoS. The main result of this paper is to provide parameter estimates for two particular mean reverting processes, with additive noise and with multiplicative noise. As a further justification, we show that a simulation of a simple bandwidth market will be described quite accurately by one of these processes.
The bandwidth market infrastructure is chosen to minimize the communication overhead for the trading parties. In this simple simulation, the trading parties are the end-users themselves, a situation which of course generates a lot of communication overhead. However, in a real implementation of this model, the trading will be handled by "virtual service providers". These providers sell services to the end-users in the form of derivative contracts, and the providers trade the router capacity tokens between themselves in a market place that is locate outside the communication network itself. The providers require estimates of the network state process parameters. Such estimates are given in this paper. The details of the network protocols and design are not given in this paper, as they do not affect the form of the stochastic process, although an efficient choice of protocol will reduce the communication overhead significantly.
Background
trade with each other, i.e. the capacity is traded on secondary markets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we present the model of the resulting price process, and the model of the market, of which a central ingredient is a detailed mechanism of price formation with very low overhead in user-user communication. The main tools used are stochastic differential equations (Itô-processes), their associated Fokker-Planck equations, and the stationary distribution of those. In section 3 we fit the parameters to the simple simulated market (without derivative contracts). In section 4 we sum up an discuss our results. Derivations of the process parameter estimates are given in an appendix.
Model 2.1 Statistical models of the price process
We approximate the discrete jump price process S(t i ) with a continuous process S(t). We try to fit two different Itô processes to the data (shown in fig. 2 ) generated by the simulation described below. Notice from the figure that the price does not appear to drift freely, but rather it returns toward a mean. We therefore try two mean-reverting processes.
Inhomogeneous drift, additive noise, constant coefficients Assuming the price process is an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, the dynamics for the price of router i would be
where W i (t) is a Wiener process and the correlation between two processes i and j is Corr[dW j (t), dW j (t)] = ρ i,j . Recall that a Wiener process has independent normal distributed increments with mean 0 and variance
where t > s. For improved readability, we omit the indices in S i (t), etc., when they are irrelevant for the understanding.
In (eq. 1) the drift term (the dt term) detracts when S is bigger than µ, and adds when S is less than µ. The amount of the increase is determined by α. The diffusion (the dW term) is independent of S.
When the simulation has run for sufficiently long time, the price S i (t) becomes independent of the starting state of the system, and reaches a stationary distribution P (t) of S(t). Using the Fokker-Planck equation (see Appendix A) gives
]. We note first that the normal distribution is non-zero in all of (−∞, ∞), meaning that S(t) can take on negative values, something that is not possible in a market with Farmer's dynamics (see sec. 2.2). However, the normal distribution has many good properties, such as that a weighted sum of normal distributed variables is also normal distributed. If prices are far from zero, this dynamics may therefore be a convenient approximation to the true distribution. Another note is that the stationary distribution only depends on the ratio σ 2 α and can therefore not distinguish between separate variations in σ 2 and α. Estimating the individual values for these parameters must be done by other means.
The observationsŜ(i), i ∈ [1, ..., L] of the process S in its stationary state are regularly spaced with distance ∆t. Since E[S] = µ, we estimate µ withμ
We estimate σ after noting that E[(dS) 2 ] = σ 2 dt + O(dt dW ). Therefore, for small ∆t,
Having estimates of α, µ and σ we are able to estimate the correlation ρ i,j between the random sources for two price processes S i and S j by solving dW i and dW j in (eq. 1) and using the estimates
where we have used E[dW ] = 0 and V ar[dW ] = dt.
Inhomogeneous drift, multiplicative noise, constant coefficients The dynamics in (eq. 1) can generate negative prices, something which is not possible in a well functioning market. By asserting a mean-reverting dynamics with multiplicative noise we get a process that is strictly positive. Assume the dynamics for the price of router i to be
where W i (t) is a Wiener process and the correlation between two processes i and j is Corr[dW j (t), dW j (t)] = ρ i,j . As before, we we omit the indices in S i (t), etc., for readability. The stationary distribution P (s) of S is
where γ ≡ 2α σ 2 , and Γ(z) is the gamma function. In (eq. 4) s takes only positive values, which is consistent, since the dynamics in (eq. 3) does not move an s from positive to negative.
The first moment of this distribution, E[S] is µ (see Appendix A). As for the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process above, we estimate µ withμ
We cannot easily estimate σ from E[(dS) 2 ] since S is in the drift term, but note that the process X(t) = log(S(t)) in (eq. 9) has additive noise. Therefore, we get for small ∆t,
To estimate α, we try two approaches. First we use the conditional expectation E[S(t + τ )|S(t)] for S in the stationary state of the system. Taking the partial derivative w.r.t τ gives a first order ODE with the solution
showing that the expected value approaches µ exponentially with τ and α determines the speed of the return. Rearrange to keep e −ατ (which is independent of S(t)) on one side, take the logarithm and take the expected value of both sides. Let τ = k∆t. We now have an estimate for α,
Having estimates of α, µ and σ we are able to estimate the correlation ρ i,j between the random sources for two price processes in the same way as above, by solving dW i and dW j in (eq. 3) and using the estimates
so that the estimate becomesρ
where again we have used E[dW ] = 0 and V ar[dW ] = dt. We simulate a network consisting of N inter-connected routers or other nodes and M network users making concurrent capacity reservations for point-to-point connections. There is one spot market per router, where the capacity shares are traded with a market maker.
Market model
Farmer's non-equilibrium market dynamics [Farmer00] are taken as prescription of how prices change due to trading (see also sec. 4.1). Farmer's model is based on the assumption that there exists a market maker that guarantees liquidity at all times, and that buying causes prices to increase, while selling causes prices to decrease. Further, the price dynamics is such that it is impossible to "move" the market by performing a sequence of trades, where the net traded volume is zero, and that the relative price changes are independent of the current value of the price. If these conditions are violated, a trader can inflict the market maker unlimited loss. From the assumptions, Farmer derives a formula that the price per unit in transaction n of ω units is S n = S n−1 e ωn/λ , where S n is the unit price in the previous trade, and λ the market depth or liquidity, i.e. the rate at which the price is changed by trading. For a derivation, see Appendix A. This model is useful since we do not have to simulate details of the order-book in each market. Instead, we can calculate the price change caused by trading directly from the last price and the size of the trade.
Simulation setup
At each time interval, m new demands are generated. A demand is a 7-tuple,
The user identities are chosen independently, so one user may receive zero or one or several new demands. If the current time is t, demand id specifies that the user uid demands cap units in each node on a path from src to dst, starting at time t and ending at time t + dur if it costs less than max to obtain the resources. If there are several paths, a choice will be made, see below. During the simulation a user reserves capacity in a router by buying that capacity, and sells excess capacity that is no longer in need.
User i owns r i,j units of j. Initially, none of the simulated users are assigned any resources or money, i.e. r i,j = 0, cash i = 0 for all i and j, nor do they have any resource demand, ω i,j = 0. When a user manages to satisfy a demand, its capital is increased by the amount max, and when resources are bought and sold, the capital is decreased and increased, respectively, by the cost of the resource. The simulation is run in L time steps from time 0 to T with time increments ∆t. At each time step where the current time is t:
• Generate m new demands (hence the total number of requests by a user is approximately exponential distributed). A demand is specified by a unique demand number id, a user uid randomly drawn from the set of M users, a source node src and a destination node dst, both randomly drawn from the set of N nodes, and the required capacity per node cap, which is randomly drawn as the ceiling of e Kξ where ξ is a uniform random variable between 0 and 1. If some demand is more important than others, a user is willing to pay more for that resource. In this simulation, max is a linear function of the required capacity, i.e. the maximum total cost max = C unit cap, where C unit is a simulation parameter. The duration (number of time steps) dur is randomly drawn integer between 1 and D.
• Calculate ω i,j , the net change of resource j of user i = uid in the following way:
-For each new demand d, user i looks at the last known transaction prices S j (t) and decides to buy cap resources along the least cost path. Since the user will not know the actual cost of a buying and later selling resources along a path, its decision on whether to buy resources or not, is determined by a parameter C max . The user decides to buy the resources if and only if the estimated total cost to buy the resources is less than C max max. The resulting demand cap is then added to the ω i,j for all the resources j on the least cost path, and the amount max is added to cash i .
-For each satisfied demand d terminating at t, decide to sell the resources that were allocated (if any) to the demand, i.e. subtract the resulting supply of liberated capacity on the least cost path if the demand was satisfied and router capacity was bought.
• All the demands on capacity in single routers (i.e. ω i,j ) are effectuated one by one in random order, and for each trade prices are updated to S j e ωi,j /λj . The cash i is decreased by ω i,j S j and the owned amount of resource is increased by ω i,j . According to the price formation formula, the trades are made at prices which depend on the actual order. The prices payed by the users are thus not the same as those used for determining the least cost path. The next known price is the one that pertains after all the trades, and is independent of the order.
• When all trading is done for this time-step, log the last transaction prices,Ŝ(t), the number of satisfied demands, and repeat.
3 Results
Simulation Parameters
The simulation was run for L = 1000 time-steps (∆t = 0.01) using the network in ( fig. 1 ). There were 10 routers and 10 users, so N = 10 and M = 10. The liquidity in all Farmer markets was chosen to be λ i = 10. The maximal cost per route users were willing to accept was determined by C unit = 100 and C max = 1 for all users. Initial prices were set toŜ i (0) = 10 in all markets. Every time step, m = 10 new demands were generated. The duration dur was uniformly distributed between 1 and 10, i.e. D = 10. The call duration sets the time scale in the simulation, as we will see below. The required amount of capacity was determined by K = 2 (see above). The resulting price process for an individual router in the simulation described in the previous section will look like the price shown in fig. 2 .
Parameter estimates
To verify that the model and estimate is good, we can plot the histogram of the observed data together with the estimated density function P (s). See (fig 3) for the resulting fit of the additive noise process. This estimation coincides with the maximum likelihood estimate of the variables. A least square fit to the values in the histogram gives a better-looking curve. However, this fit only gives µ and the ratio σ 2 α , as noted above. As we can see from the left hand side of (eq. 5) for the multiplicative noise process, plotting the right hand side as a function of k should result in a straight line if α is constant. However, as we can see in (fig. 4) , the line is straight up to some k that depends on the simulation parameters and error. The estimation is very sensitive to errors inμ, especially in the denominator ifŜ is nearμ, which results in a flattened out jagged line, since e −α k∆t is less than the simulation error for larger k. It eventually flattens out which means that α appears to decrease for larger τ .
Another way to estimate α is to estimate µ and σ as above, and then fit the observed distribution to the distribution (eq. 4) using the least square method. See (fig. 5 ) for a plot of the model fit. Plotting the histograms of ∆Ŵ shows us if the model is good. If that is the case, the ∆Ŵ should behave like samples of a Wiener process, i.e. be normal distributed. As can be seen in (fig. 6 ), the model (eq. 3) fits well if the market liquidity is high. However, if market liquidity is low then the assumed price model does not provide a good fit.
Price Correlations
The resource prices in a network of resources depend on the prices of other resources, since they are traded in groups. Using the parameter estimates of the price dynamics above, we get the correlation matrix in (tab. 1) for a simulation with high liquidity markets (λ i = 100).
We find that prices generally are positively correlated. Comparing with the network graph( fig. 1) , one can see that prices of neighboring nodes often are strongly positively correlated with an average correlation coefficient of around 0.4, compared to 0.03 for nodes that are not connected. The most significant exception is nodes 3 and 7. Looking at the network graph it is clear that no least cost path can contain both 3 and 7, except for the path from 3 to 7.
Efficiency of the market based resource allocation
The efficiency of a market based resource allocation scheme depends on how well prices reflect the available information about resource demands. Two sources for bad performance is that price quotes are outdated, or that they do not reflect knowledge about the price behavior, e.g. periodic price fluctuations, or future prices. To measure efficiency, we can measure the resource utilization to compare which markets are able to capture most information. fig.: the covariance between S(t + k∆t) and S(t). The auto-correlation deviates some from an exponential, possibly because the price dynamics has higher order than assumed. It would explain why the estimate in the left plot deviates from an exponential. Simulation time, 100 000 time steps, λ i = 10, and D = 100. Communication costs The number of messages sent in the negotiation phase of this kind of system is negligible, since all users operate on old price quotes and place bids at market, i.e. accept the price whatever it may be. They do not update their price quotes for every bid. Therefore, less than M messages per trade come in to a user (the potential quote update from each market). One message per trade (the bid) go out from each user to the markets that contain resources that the user have chosen. No messages need to be communicated between the end-users. 1
Successful connection ratio
In the Farmer market model, the less liquid the markets are, the less valid are the price quotes. To the left in ( fig. 7 ) the ratio of successful connections is plotted as a function of the market liquidity λ i for simulations with the parameters described in (sec. 3.1). The graphs corresponds to different values of the decision parameter C max . Low liquidity causes large price fluctuations, making the prices higher than the limit C max max (see sec. 2.3) which inhibits many connections. Note that a connection is considered successful even if the net cost (after releasing the resources) is higher than max. Net profit To the right in ( fig. 7) we plot the average profit as a function of the liquidity for a number of values of C max . Large values of C max causes the users to buy resources when they are expensive. If the liquidity is high, the users sell resources at approximately the same price, but with low liquidity, prices will move significantly downwards when the resources are sold, causing a net loss to the user.
The particular way the max cost for a connection is determined of course very much determines which of the different kinds of traffic that is promoted in the network. Different schemes could for instance promote short or long paths, high or low capacity connections, etc.
Average load The average load, or reserved capacity in a router is with the Farmer dynamics a direct function of the market price, ω(t) = λ log S(t) S(0) . If two simulations that allocate the same connections differ in load, the higher load depends on inefficient routing that does not choose efficient path. If the simulations differ in allocated connections, the comparison is less straight forward, and depends on the choice of metric above. We intend to return to a longer discussion on efficiency, in particular for load balancing, in a future contribution.
Discussion
The traditional statistical models used for telephony have been found to inadequately model data network traffic. Data communication has been found to show a very bursty or fractal behavior as one communication event often generates a burst of more communication to other parts of the network. Data communication is generally short lived and often with strong latency bounds, due to the increasing use of computer networks for interactive communication. For short lived communication with low transfered amount, traditional switched best effort networks will probably continue to provide a very efficient solution for a long time. However, with increasing demand of streaming real-time data such as high quality video-telephony, video-on-demand, etc., it is necessary to be able to reserve capacity. The alternatives are large buffers, which has bad latency performance, or migrating data (intelligent replication), which can reduce load for one-to-many communication. Neither is suited for point-to-point communication service guarantees. 
Market model
First, note that the trading is not intended to take place inside a particular router, but on a secondary market "outside" the network. Still, it is important that the market is rapid and principally stateless, which is one reason for choosing the Farmer market model of the market. In our simulation, Farmer's market dynamics can be interpreted either as prescriptions of how a rational market maker should modify the market prices, or as a model of the aggregate behavior of market price changes during some period of time.
With the former interpretation, the Farmer dynamics can be used to implement a market maker program that brokers trading between end-users. The dynamics is derived from the assumption that it is impossible to change prices by 'trade in circles'. This assumption is a necessary condition for any market maker strategy, since otherwise anyone can exploit the market and gain an unlimited amount of money from the market maker.
The latter interpretation can be used when we want to simulate a part of a market with many concurrent trades. Since trading causes prices to change means that it is impossible to have updated price information at the time they place their bid. It is only possible to have completely updated price info if the trading is synchronous, something that severely reduces the number of bids a market can handle per time unit if communication delays are taken into account.
The market liquidity (or market depth) parameter λ i determines the speed at which prices change. When the dynamics interpreted as prescriptions for a market maker, it is up to the market maker to adjust λ i in order to reduce the risk of running out of resources. If we model an existing bandwidth market, λ i is an observable parameter which must be determined from the distribution of price jumps in relation to traded volume. The more resources in relation to the order size, the larger λ i . A bandwidth market that is trading the capacity of a high capacity router can, everything else being equal, be expected to have a higher λ i than a similar market for a congested or inefficient router. 
Successful connections

User model
The user model in the simulation above is very simple, and the user trading is very simplistic. Users do not accumulate demand, they do not trade speculatively, nor do they reallocate their point-to-point connections in case of congestion. This may be seen an overly simple model for a "real" computer network, however it is not an important defect for the purposes of this paper (to produce price generating statistical models of the system state), as the form of the price process will not be changed radically by more complex end-user behavior. Another issue is that the system is assumed to be in a fairly steady state, there is no demand increase or decrease over time. A model that captures that requires that we change the process drift term (the time derivative). Periodic price processes are used in commodities markets such as (electricity) power markets, and that analysis follows the same lines as described in this paper. The end-users do not produce "fat-tail distributed" data, as is commonly observed for data communication such as file transfer. The reason for this is that we anticipate that video-on-demand-like services (which do not produce fat tailed traffic) provide a probable early deployment scenario. We think however it would be interesting to extend this work to include other stochastic processes too.
Price process model
In the mean reverting processes investigated here, α determines the speed with which the process returns towards its statistical average µ. The speed of return depends on the characteristic time length of the system, determined by the simulation parameter D, the call length. With a large D, the prices will be correlated with previous prices over a longer time period, which results in a small α. With a small D, the price effect of previous calls will soon be forgotten, resulting in a high α.
In the 'bandwidth market' presented in this paper, end users buy the required resources themselves. The demand for updated price quotes results generates additional network traffic. In an extended model, we will allow risk neutral middle men to sell options on the resources. Since updated quotes will then only be required by the (few) middle men doing the actual trading, the additional traffic would be greatly reduced. We intend to return to these topics in future work. Appendix A Stationary Distribution S(t) is an Itô process with the dynamics dS(t) = a(t, S(t))dt + b(t, S(t))dW (t), and P (s, T ; s 0 , t) is the contingent probability distribution of S at time T given S(t) = s 0 . P obeys the Fokker-Planck equation a.k.a the forward Kolmogorov equation,
An important class of stochastic processes are those that are stationary. For those, if T − t is sufficiently large, the contingent distribution P no longer depends on s 0 , and can be substituted with the stationary distribution P (s), which does not depend on s 0 , t or T . Two ways in which a stochastic process can fail to be stationary is if the coefficients, e.g. a and b, are explicitly time-dependent, or if there is no distribution P (s). The latter happens for instance in ordinary random diffusion, in which the probability gradually spreads out without reaching a limit.
Assuming that a stationary distribution has been reached, the time derivative drops out of (eq. 6), and the equation can be integrated once to be
which is an ODE. One further integration of (eq. 7) gives
where C is a normalization constant determined by P (s)ds = 1.
The Additive Noise Process
Stationary density function, mean and variance Assume the price dynamics
Then the conditional stationary probability distribution of S is, using (eq. 8),
where C 0 = (πσ 2 /α) − 1 2 . P (s) can be identified as the density function for a normal distribution with mean µ and variance σ 2 /2α.
The Multiplicative Noise Process
Stationary density function Assume the price dynamics dS(t) = α(µ − S(t))dt + σSdW (t) Using (eq. 8)
An alternative derivation is to let X(t) = log S(t). Itô's lemma gives that
Then the stationary probability distribution Q(x) of X is , using (eq. 8),
where C 1 is a normalization constant, and γ ≡ 2α σ 2 for readability. The stationary density function P (s) for S is found by recalling X = log(S) and P (s)ds ≡ Q(log(s))d(log(s))
The constant C 2 is determined by normalization and identifying the integral as a gamma function, Γ(z+1) = ∞ 0 t z e −t dt = zΓ(z). After the substitution t = γµ 1 s we get
Stationary mean Use the same substitution, t = γµ 1 s to obtain
Conditional expected value Let f (τ |S(t)) be the conditional expectation of S(t + τ ) given S(t). 
Farmer's market dynamics
Let S be the current price, ω the net demand andS the price at which the demand can be met. We seek a functional relationship of the typeS ≡S(S, ω), whereS depends continuously on S and ω. Assume the price to be positive and bounded,S to be an increasing function of ω, and that prices are only changed through trading,S(S, 0) = S. Assume furthermore that one cannot make money by trading in circles S(S(S(S, ω 1 ), ω 2 ), −(ω 1 + ω 2 )) = S (10) and the relative price change is independent of the absolute price,
Because of (10) we see thatS(S(S, ω), −ω) = S, so the inverse isS −1 (S, ω) =S(S, −ω), whereS −1 is the inverse function ofS. ApplyingS −1 (·, −(ω 1 + ω 2 )) on (10) to see that S(S(S, ω 1 ), ω 2 ) =S(S, ω 1 + ω 2 ) (12) (11) together with (12) implies that φ(ω 1 )φ(ω 2 ) = φ(ω 1 + ω 2 ) which implies φ(x) = e x/λ for some constant λ. ThereforeS (S, ω) = S e ω/λ (13)
